簡述Xss
一，什么是Xss 攻擊
百度百科：
? XSS攻擊通常指的是通過利用網頁開發時留下的漏洞，通過巧妙的方法注入惡意指令代碼到網頁，使用戶加載并執行攻擊者惡意制造的網頁程式，這些惡意網頁程式通常是JavaScript，但實際上也可以包括Java、 VBScript、ActiveX、 Flash 或者甚至是普通的HTML，攻擊成功后，攻擊者可能得到包括但不限于更高的權限（如執行一些操作）、私密網頁內容、會話和cookie等各種內容，
目前,XSS是黑客最常用來攻擊互聯網的技術之一,其對互聯網安全的危害性在國際排名第二,它是利用Web站點,把病毒混入文本,意圖蒙蔽計算機中資訊安全系統的"眼睛",對原網站代碼進行攻擊,盜取人們的資訊
通俗解釋：
? 這里舉一個簡單的例子，就是留言板，我們知道留言板通常的任務就是把用戶留言的內容展示出來，正常情況下，用戶的留言都是正常的語言文字，留言板顯示的內容也就沒毛病，然而這個時候如果有人不按套路出牌，在留言內容中丟進去一行
<script>alert(“hey!you are attacked”)</script>
那么留言板界面的網頁代碼就會變成形如以下：
<html>
<head>
<title>留言板</title>
</head>
<body>
<div id=”board”
<script>alert(“hey!you are attacked”)</script>
</div>
</body>
</html>
那么這個時候問題就來了，當瀏覽器決議到用戶輸入的代碼那一行時會發生什么呢？答案很顯然，瀏覽器并不知道這些代碼改變了原本程式的意圖，會照做彈出一個資訊框，就像這樣，
二，Xss的危害
? 其實歸根結底，XSS的攻擊方式就是想辦法“教唆”用戶的瀏覽器去執行一些這個網頁中原本不存在的前端代碼，達到對網頁的攻擊，
? 盡管一個資訊框突然彈出來并不怎么友好，但也不至于會造成什么真實傷害啊，的確如此，但要說明的是，這里拿資訊框說事僅僅是為了舉個例子，真正的黑客攻擊在XSS中除非惡作劇，不然是不會在惡意植入代碼中寫上alert（“say something”）的，
在真正的應用中，XSS攻擊可以干的事情還有很多，這里舉兩個例子，
竊取網頁瀏覽中的cookie值
在網頁瀏覽中我們常常涉及到用戶登錄，登錄完畢之后服務端會回傳一個cookie值，這個cookie值相當于一個令牌，拿著這張令牌就等同于證明了你是某個用戶，
如果你的cookie值被竊取，那么攻擊者很可能能夠直接利用你的這張令牌不用密碼就登錄你的賬戶，如果想要通過script腳本獲得當前頁面的cookie值，通常會用到document.cookie，
試想下如果像空間說說中能夠寫入xss攻擊陳述句，那豈不是看了你說說的人的號你都可以登錄（不過某些廠商的cookie有其他驗證措施如：Http-Only保證同一cookie不能被濫用）
劫持流量實作惡意跳轉
這個很簡單，就是在網頁中想辦法插入一句像這樣的陳述句：
<script>window.location.href="http://www.baidu.com";</script>
那么所訪問的網站就會被跳轉到百度的首頁，
Xss攻擊方式
- 大小寫繞過
例如：
這個繞過方式的出現是因為網站僅僅只過濾了標簽(Script)，而沒有考慮標簽中的大小寫并不影響瀏覽器的解釋所致，具體的方式就像這樣：
http://192.168.1.102/xss/example2.php?name=<sCript>alert("hey!")</scRipt>
- 利用過濾后回傳陳述句再次構成攻擊陳述句來繞過
- 并不是只有script標簽才可以插入代碼
我們利用如下方式：
[http://192.168.1.102/xss/example4.php?name=
src='https://www.cnblogs.com/blbl-blog/archive/2023/03/07/w.123' one rror='alert("hey!")'>
就可以再次愉快的彈窗，原因很簡單，我們指定的圖片地址根本不存在也就是一定會發生錯誤，這時候onerror里面的代碼自然就得到了執行，
以下列舉幾個常用的可插入代碼的標簽，
<a onm ousemove=’do something here’>
當用戶滑鼠移動時即可運行代碼
<div onm ouseover=‘do something here’>
當用戶滑鼠在這個塊上面時即可運行（可以配合weight等引數將div覆寫頁面，滑鼠不劃過都不行）
- 編碼腳本代碼繞過關鍵字過濾
有的時候，服務器往往會對代碼中的關鍵字（如alert）進行過濾，這個時候我們可以嘗試將關鍵字進行編碼后再插入，不過直接顯示編碼是不能被瀏覽器執行的，我們可以用另一個陳述句eval（）來實作，eval()會將編碼過的陳述句解碼后再執行，簡直太貼心了，
例如alert(1)編碼過后就是
\u0061\u006c\u0065\u0072\u0074(1)
所以構建出來的攻擊陳述句如下：
http://192.168.1.102/xss/example5.php?name=eval(\u0061\u006c\u0065\u0072\u0074(1))
- 主動閉合標簽實作注入代碼
- 組合各種方式
Xss 的防范手段
- 首先是過濾，對諸如(script、img、a)等標簽進行過濾，
- 其次是編碼，像一些常見的符號，如<>在輸入的時候要對其進行轉換編碼，這樣做瀏覽器是不會對該標簽進行解釋執行的，同時也不影響顯示效果，
- 最后是限制，通過以上的案例我們不難發現xss攻擊要能達成往往需要較長的字串，因此對于一些可以預期的輸入可以通過限制長度強制截斷來進行防御，
Spring Boot 防 Xss 代碼攻擊
從上面可以知道，Xss 攻擊是對入參或者說輸出進行修改，劫持內容達到目的，因此我們需要對整個系統的提交進行過濾和轉義，
spring boot 防范 XSS 攻擊可以使用過濾器，對內容進行轉義，過濾，
這里就采用Spring boot+Filter的方式實作一個Xss的全域過濾器
Spring boot實作一個Xss過濾器, 常用的有兩種方式:
第一種：
- 自定義過濾器
- 重寫HttpServletRequestWrapper、重寫getHeader()、getParameter()、getParameterValues()、getInputStream()實作對傳統“鍵值對”傳參方式的過濾
- 重寫getInputStream()實作對Json方式傳參的過濾,也就是@RequestBody引數
第二種：
- 自定義序列化器, 對MappingJackson2HttpMessageConverter 的objectMapper做設定.
重寫JsonSerializer.serialize()實作對出參的過濾 (PS: 資料原樣保存, 取出來的時候轉義)
重寫JsonDeserializer.deserialize()實作對入參的過濾 (PS: 資料轉義后保存)
防 XSS 攻擊流程圖
代碼撰寫流程圖：
自定義過濾器
public class XssFilter implements Filter
{
/**
* 排除鏈接
*/
public List<String> excludes = new ArrayList<>();
@Override
public void init(FilterConfig filterConfig) throws ServletException
{
String tempExcludes = filterConfig.getInitParameter("excludes");
if (StringUtils.isNotEmpty(tempExcludes))
{
String[] url = tempExcludes.split(",");
for (int i = 0; url != null && i < url.length; i++)
{
excludes.add(url[i]);
}
}
}
@Override
public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain)
throws IOException, ServletException
{
HttpServletRequest req = (HttpServletRequest) request;
HttpServletResponse resp = (HttpServletResponse) response;
if (handleExcludeURL(req, resp))
{
// 傳遞過濾器
chain.doFilter(request, response);
return;
}
XssHttpServletRequestWrapper xssRequest = new XssHttpServletRequestWrapper((HttpServletRequest) request);
chain.doFilter(xssRequest, response);
}
private boolean handleExcludeURL(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)
{
String url = request.getServletPath();
String method = request.getMethod();
// GET DELETE 不過濾
if (method == null || HttpMethod.GET.matches(method) || HttpMethod.DELETE.matches(method))
{
return true;
}
return StringUtils.matches(url, excludes);
}
@Override
public void destroy()
{
}
}
上面自定義過濾器需要到的StringUtils 工具類
/**
* 查找指定字串是否匹配指定字串串列中的任意一個字串
*
* @param str 指定字串
* @param strs 需要檢查的字串陣列
* @return 是否匹配
*/
public static boolean matches(String str, List<String> strs)
{
if (isEmpty(str) || isEmpty(strs))
{
return false;
}
for (String pattern : strs)
{
if (isMatch(pattern, str))
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* 判斷url是否與規則配置:
* ? 表示單個字符;
* * 表示一層路徑內的任意字串，不可跨層級;
* ** 表示任意層路徑;
*
* @param pattern 匹配規則
* @param url 需要匹配的url
* @return
*/
public static boolean isMatch(String pattern, String url)
{
AntPathMatcher matcher = new AntPathMatcher();
return matcher.match(pattern, url);
}
Xss 過濾處理
/**
* XSS過濾處理
*
* @author lh
*/
public class XssHttpServletRequestWrapper extends HttpServletRequestWrapper
{
/**
* @param request
*/
public XssHttpServletRequestWrapper(HttpServletRequest request)
{
super(request);
}
// 重寫獲取引數進行轉義
@Override
public String[] getParameterValues(String name)
{
String[] values = super.getParameterValues(name);
if (values != null)
{
int length = values.length;
String[] escapesValues = new String[length];
for (int i = 0; i < length; i++)
{
// 防xss攻擊和過濾前后空格
escapesValues[i] = EscapeUtil.clean(values[i]).trim();
}
return escapesValues;
}
return super.getParameterValues(name);
}
@Override
public ServletInputStream getInputStream() throws IOException
{
// 非json型別，直接回傳
if (!isJsonRequest())
{
return super.getInputStream();
}
// 為空，直接回傳
String json = IOUtils.toString(super.getInputStream(), "utf-8");
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(json))
{
return super.getInputStream();
}
// xss過濾
json = EscapeUtil.clean(json).trim();
byte[] jsonBytes = json.getBytes("utf-8");
final ByteArrayInputStream bis = new ByteArrayInputStream(jsonBytes);
return new ServletInputStream()
{
@Override
public boolean isFinished()
{
return true;
}
@Override
public boolean isReady()
{
return true;
}
@Override
public int available() throws IOException
{
return jsonBytes.length;
}
@Override
public void setReadListener(ReadListener readListener)
{
}
@Override
public int read() throws IOException
{
return bis.read();
}
};
}
/**
* 是否是Json請求
*
* @param request
*/
public boolean isJsonRequest()
{
String header = super.getHeader(HttpHeaders.CONTENT_TYPE);
return StringUtils.startsWithIgnoreCase(header, MediaType.APPLICATION_JSON_VALUE);
}
}
轉義Html字符
Clean 方法
public static String clean(String content)
{
return new HTMLFilter().filter(content);
}
HTML 過濾器
/**
* HTML過濾器，用于去除XSS漏洞隱患，
*
* @author lh
*/
public final class HTMLFilter
{
/**
* regex flag union representing /si modifiers in php
**/
private static final int REGEX_FLAGS_SI = Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE | Pattern.DOTALL;
private static final Pattern P_COMMENTS = Pattern.compile("<!--(.*?)-->", Pattern.DOTALL);
private static final Pattern P_COMMENT = Pattern.compile("^!--(.*)--$", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_TAGS = Pattern.compile("<(.*?)>", Pattern.DOTALL);
private static final Pattern P_END_TAG = Pattern.compile("^/([a-z0-9]+)", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_START_TAG = Pattern.compile("^([a-z0-9]+)(.*?)(/?)$", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_QUOTED_ATTRIBUTES = Pattern.compile("([a-z0-9]+)=([\"'])(.*?)\\2", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_UNQUOTED_ATTRIBUTES = Pattern.compile("([a-z0-9]+)(=)([^\"\\s']+)", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_PROTOCOL = Pattern.compile("^([^:]+):", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_ENTITY = Pattern.compile("&#(\\d+);?");
private static final Pattern P_ENTITY_UNICODE = Pattern.compile("&#x([0-9a-f]+);?");
private static final Pattern P_ENCODE = Pattern.compile("%([0-9a-f]{2});?");
private static final Pattern P_VALID_ENTITIES = Pattern.compile("&([^&;]*)(?=(;|&|$))");
private static final Pattern P_VALID_QUOTES = Pattern.compile("(>|^)([^<]+?)(<|$)", Pattern.DOTALL);
private static final Pattern P_END_ARROW = Pattern.compile("^>");
private static final Pattern P_BODY_TO_END = Pattern.compile("<([^>]*?)(?=<|$)");
private static final Pattern P_XML_CONTENT = Pattern.compile("(^|>)([^<]*?)(?=>)");
private static final Pattern P_STRAY_LEFT_ARROW = Pattern.compile("<([^>]*?)(?=<|$)");
private static final Pattern P_STRAY_RIGHT_ARROW = Pattern.compile("(^|>)([^<]*?)(?=>)");
private static final Pattern P_AMP = Pattern.compile("&");
private static final Pattern P_QUOTE = Pattern.compile("\"");
private static final Pattern P_LEFT_ARROW = Pattern.compile("<");
private static final Pattern P_RIGHT_ARROW = Pattern.compile(">");
private static final Pattern P_BOTH_ARROWS = Pattern.compile("<>");
// @xxx could grow large... maybe use sesat's ReferenceMap
private static final ConcurrentMap<String, Pattern> P_REMOVE_PAIR_BLANKS = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private static final ConcurrentMap<String, Pattern> P_REMOVE_SELF_BLANKS = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/**
* set of allowed html elements, along with allowed attributes for each element
**/
private final Map<String, List<String>> vAllowed;
/**
* counts of open tags for each (allowable) html element
**/
private final Map<String, Integer> vTagCounts = new HashMap<>();
/**
* html elements which must always be self-closing (e.g. "<img />")
**/
private final String[] vSelfClosingTags;
/**
* html elements which must always have separate opening and closing tags (e.g. "<b></b>")
**/
private final String[] vNeedClosingTags;
/**
* set of disallowed html elements
**/
private final String[] vDisallowed;
/**
* attributes which should be checked for valid protocols
**/
private final String[] vProtocolAtts;
/**
* allowed protocols
**/
private final String[] vAllowedProtocols;
/**
* tags which should be removed if they contain no content (e.g. "<b></b>" or "<b />")
**/
private final String[] vRemoveBlanks;
/**
* entities allowed within html markup
**/
private final String[] vAllowedEntities;
/**
* flag determining whether comments are allowed in input String.
*/
private final boolean stripComment;
private final boolean encodeQuotes;
/**
* flag determining whether to try to make tags when presented with "unbalanced" angle brackets (e.g. "<b text </b>"
* becomes "<b> text </b>"). If set to false, unbalanced angle brackets will be html escaped.
*/
private final boolean alwaysMakeTags;
/**
* Default constructor.
*/
public HTMLFilter()
{
vAllowed = new HashMap<>();
final ArrayList<String> a_atts = new ArrayList<>();
a_atts.add("href");
a_atts.add("target");
vAllowed.put("a", a_atts);
final ArrayList<String> img_atts = new ArrayList<>();
img_atts.add("src");
img_atts.add("width");
img_atts.add("height");
img_atts.add("alt");
vAllowed.put("img", img_atts);
final ArrayList<String> no_atts = new ArrayList<>();
vAllowed.put("b", no_atts);
vAllowed.put("strong", no_atts);
vAllowed.put("i", no_atts);
vAllowed.put("em", no_atts);
vSelfClosingTags = new String[] { "img" };
vNeedClosingTags = new String[] { "a", "b", "strong", "i", "em" };
vDisallowed = new String[] {};
vAllowedProtocols = new String[] { "http", "mailto", "https" }; // no ftp.
vProtocolAtts = new String[] { "src", "href" };
vRemoveBlanks = new String[] { "a", "b", "strong", "i", "em" };
vAllowedEntities = new String[] { "amp", "gt", "lt", "quot" };
stripComment = true;
encodeQuotes = true;
alwaysMakeTags = false;
}
/**
* Map-parameter configurable constructor.
*
* @param conf map containing configuration. keys match field names.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
public HTMLFilter(final Map<String, Object> conf)
{
assert conf.containsKey("vAllowed") : "configuration requires vAllowed";
assert conf.containsKey("vSelfClosingTags") : "configuration requires vSelfClosingTags";
assert conf.containsKey("vNeedClosingTags") : "configuration requires vNeedClosingTags";
assert conf.containsKey("vDisallowed") : "configuration requires vDisallowed";
assert conf.containsKey("vAllowedProtocols") : "configuration requires vAllowedProtocols";
assert conf.containsKey("vProtocolAtts") : "configuration requires vProtocolAtts";
assert conf.containsKey("vRemoveBlanks") : "configuration requires vRemoveBlanks";
assert conf.containsKey("vAllowedEntities") : "configuration requires vAllowedEntities";
vAllowed = Collections.unmodifiableMap((HashMap<String, List<String>>) conf.get("vAllowed"));
vSelfClosingTags = (String[]) conf.get("vSelfClosingTags");
vNeedClosingTags = (String[]) conf.get("vNeedClosingTags");
vDisallowed = (String[]) conf.get("vDisallowed");
vAllowedProtocols = (String[]) conf.get("vAllowedProtocols");
vProtocolAtts = (String[]) conf.get("vProtocolAtts");
vRemoveBlanks = (String[]) conf.get("vRemoveBlanks");
vAllowedEntities = (String[]) conf.get("vAllowedEntities");
stripComment = conf.containsKey("stripComment") ? (Boolean) conf.get("stripComment") : true;
encodeQuotes = conf.containsKey("encodeQuotes") ? (Boolean) conf.get("encodeQuotes") : true;
alwaysMakeTags = conf.containsKey("alwaysMakeTags") ? (Boolean) conf.get("alwaysMakeTags") : true;
}
private void reset()
{
vTagCounts.clear();
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------
// my versions of some PHP library functions
public static String chr(final int decimal)
{
return String.valueOf((char) decimal);
}
public static String htmlSpecialChars(final String s)
{
String result = s;
result = regexReplace(P_AMP, "&", result);
result = regexReplace(P_QUOTE, """, result);
result = regexReplace(P_LEFT_ARROW, "<", result);
result = regexReplace(P_RIGHT_ARROW, ">", result);
return result;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* given a user submitted input String, filter out any invalid or restricted html.
*
* @param input text (i.e. submitted by a user) than may contain html
* @return "clean" version of input, with only valid, whitelisted html elements allowed
*/
public String filter(final String input)
{
reset();
String s = input;
s = escapeComments(s);
s = balanceHTML(s);
s = checkTags(s);
s = processRemoveBlanks(s);
// s = validateEntities(s);
return s;
}
public boolean isAlwaysMakeTags()
{
return alwaysMakeTags;
}
public boolean isStripComments()
{
return stripComment;
}
private String escapeComments(final String s)
{
final Matcher m = P_COMMENTS.matcher(s);
final StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
if (m.find())
{
final String match = m.group(1); // (.*?)
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement("<!--" + htmlSpecialChars(match) + "-->"));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
return buf.toString();
}
private String balanceHTML(String s)
{
if (alwaysMakeTags)
{
//
// try and form html
//
s = regexReplace(P_END_ARROW, "", s);
// 不追加結束標簽
s = regexReplace(P_BODY_TO_END, "<$1>", s);
s = regexReplace(P_XML_CONTENT, "$1<$2", s);
}
else
{
//
// escape stray brackets
//
s = regexReplace(P_STRAY_LEFT_ARROW, "<$1", s);
s = regexReplace(P_STRAY_RIGHT_ARROW, "$1$2><", s);
//
// the last regexp causes '<>' entities to appear
// (we need to do a lookahead assertion so that the last bracket can
// be used in the next pass of the regexp)
//
s = regexReplace(P_BOTH_ARROWS, "", s);
}
return s;
}
private String checkTags(String s)
{
Matcher m = P_TAGS.matcher(s);
final StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
while (m.find())
{
String replaceStr = m.group(1);
replaceStr = processTag(replaceStr);
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(replaceStr));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
// these get tallied in processTag
// (remember to reset before subsequent calls to filter method)
final StringBuilder sBuilder = new StringBuilder(buf.toString());
for (String key : vTagCounts.keySet())
{
for (int ii = 0; ii < vTagCounts.get(key); ii++)
{
sBuilder.append("</").append(key).append(">");
}
}
s = sBuilder.toString();
return s;
}
private String processRemoveBlanks(final String s)
{
String result = s;
for (String tag : vRemoveBlanks)
{
if (!P_REMOVE_PAIR_BLANKS.containsKey(tag))
{
P_REMOVE_PAIR_BLANKS.putIfAbsent(tag, Pattern.compile("<" + tag + "(\\s[^>]*)?></" + tag + ">"));
}
result = regexReplace(P_REMOVE_PAIR_BLANKS.get(tag), "", result);
if (!P_REMOVE_SELF_BLANKS.containsKey(tag))
{
P_REMOVE_SELF_BLANKS.putIfAbsent(tag, Pattern.compile("<" + tag + "(\\s[^>]*)?/>"));
}
result = regexReplace(P_REMOVE_SELF_BLANKS.get(tag), "", result);
}
return result;
}
private static String regexReplace(final Pattern regex_pattern, final String replacement, final String s)
{
Matcher m = regex_pattern.matcher(s);
return m.replaceAll(replacement);
}
private String processTag(final String s)
{
// ending tags
Matcher m = P_END_TAG.matcher(s);
if (m.find())
{
final String name = m.group(1).toLowerCase();
if (allowed(name))
{
if (!inArray(name, vSelfClosingTags))
{
if (vTagCounts.containsKey(name))
{
vTagCounts.put(name, vTagCounts.get(name) - 1);
return "</" + name + ">";
}
}
}
}
// starting tags
m = P_START_TAG.matcher(s);
if (m.find())
{
final String name = m.group(1).toLowerCase();
final String body = m.group(2);
String ending = m.group(3);
// debug( "in a starting tag, name='" + name + "'; body='" + body + "'; ending='" + ending + "'" );
if (allowed(name))
{
final StringBuilder params = new StringBuilder();
final Matcher m2 = P_QUOTED_ATTRIBUTES.matcher(body);
final Matcher m3 = P_UNQUOTED_ATTRIBUTES.matcher(body);
final List<String> paramNames = new ArrayList<>();
final List<String> paramValues = new ArrayList<>();
while (m2.find())
{
paramNames.add(m2.group(1)); // ([a-z0-9]+)
paramValues.add(m2.group(3)); // (.*?)
}
while (m3.find())
{
paramNames.add(m3.group(1)); // ([a-z0-9]+)
paramValues.add(m3.group(3)); // ([^\"\\s']+)
}
String paramName, paramValue;
for (int ii = 0; ii < paramNames.size(); ii++)
{
paramName = paramNames.get(ii).toLowerCase();
paramValue = https://www.cnblogs.com/blbl-blog/archive/2023/03/07/paramValues.get(ii);
// debug("paramName='" + paramName + "'" );
// debug( "paramValue='" + paramValue + "'" );
// debug( "allowed? " + vAllowed.get( name ).contains( paramName ) );
if (allowedAttribute(name, paramName))
{
if (inArray(paramName, vProtocolAtts))
{
paramValue = https://www.cnblogs.com/blbl-blog/archive/2023/03/07/processParamProtocol(paramValue);
}
params.append(' ').append(paramName).append("=\\\"").append(paramValue).append("\\\"");
}
}
if (inArray(name, vSelfClosingTags))
{
ending = " /";
}
if (inArray(name, vNeedClosingTags))
{
ending = "";
}
if (ending == null || ending.length() < 1)
{
if (vTagCounts.containsKey(name))
{
vTagCounts.put(name, vTagCounts.get(name) + 1);
}
else
{
vTagCounts.put(name, 1);
}
}
else
{
ending = " /";
}
return "<" + name + params + ending + ">";
}
else
{
return "";
}
}
// comments
m = P_COMMENT.matcher(s);
if (!stripComment && m.find())
{
return "<" + m.group() + ">";
}
return "";
}
private String processParamProtocol(String s)
{
s = decodeEntities(s);
final Matcher m = P_PROTOCOL.matcher(s);
if (m.find())
{
final String protocol = m.group(1);
if (!inArray(protocol, vAllowedProtocols))
{
// bad protocol, turn into local anchor link instead
s = "#" + s.substring(protocol.length() + 1);
if (s.startsWith("#//"))
{
s = "#" + s.substring(3);
}
}
}
return s;
}
private String decodeEntities(String s)
{
StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
Matcher m = P_ENTITY.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String match = m.group(1);
final int decimal = Integer.decode(match).intValue();
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(chr(decimal)));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
s = buf.toString();
buf = new StringBuffer();
m = P_ENTITY_UNICODE.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String match = m.group(1);
final int decimal = Integer.valueOf(match, 16).intValue();
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(chr(decimal)));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
s = buf.toString();
buf = new StringBuffer();
m = P_ENCODE.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String match = m.group(1);
final int decimal = Integer.valueOf(match, 16).intValue();
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(chr(decimal)));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
s = buf.toString();
s = validateEntities(s);
return s;
}
private String validateEntities(final String s)
{
StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
// validate entities throughout the string
Matcher m = P_VALID_ENTITIES.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String one = m.group(1); // ([^&;]*)
final String two = m.group(2); // (?=(;|&|$))
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(checkEntity(one, two)));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
return encodeQuotes(buf.toString());
}
private String encodeQuotes(final String s)
{
if (encodeQuotes)
{
StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
Matcher m = P_VALID_QUOTES.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String one = m.group(1); // (>|^)
final String two = m.group(2); // ([^<]+?)
final String three = m.group(3); // (<|$)
// 不替換雙引號為"，防止json格式無效 regexReplace(P_QUOTE, """, two)
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(one + two + three));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
return buf.toString();
}
else
{
return s;
}
}
private String checkEntity(final String preamble, final String term)
{
return ";".equals(term) && isValidEntity(preamble) ? '&' + preamble : "&" + preamble;
}
private boolean isValidEntity(final String entity)
{
return inArray(entity, vAllowedEntities);
}
private static boolean inArray(final String s, final String[] array)
{
for (String item : array)
{
if (item != null && item.equals(s))
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
private boolean allowed(final String name)
{
return (vAllowed.isEmpty() || vAllowed.containsKey(name)) && !inArray(name, vDisallowed);
}
private boolean allowedAttribute(final String name, final String paramName)
{
return allowed(name) && (vAllowed.isEmpty() || vAllowed.get(name).contains(paramName));
}
}
注冊配置過濾器bean
注冊bean
@Configuration
public class FilterConfig
{
@Value("${xss.excludes}")
private String excludes;
@Value("${xss.urlPatterns}")
private String urlPatterns;
@SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" })
@Bean
@ConditionalOnProperty(value = "https://www.cnblogs.com/blbl-blog/archive/2023/03/07/xss.enabled", havingValue = "https://www.cnblogs.com/blbl-blog/archive/2023/03/07/true")
public FilterRegistrationBean xssFilterRegistration()
{
FilterRegistrationBean registration = new FilterRegistrationBean();
registration.setDispatcherTypes(DispatcherType.REQUEST);
registration.setFilter(new XssFilter());
//添加過濾路徑
registration.addUrlPatterns(StringUtils.split(urlPatterns, ","));
registration.setName("xssFilter");
registration.setOrder(FilterRegistrationBean.HIGHEST_PRECEDENCE);
//設定初始化引數
Map<String, String> initParameters = new HashMap<String, String>();
initParameters.put("excludes", excludes);
registration.setInitParameters(initParameters);
return registration;
}
@SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" })
@Bean
public FilterRegistrationBean someFilterRegistration()
{
FilterRegistrationBean registration = new FilterRegistrationBean();
registration.setFilter(new RepeatableFilter());
registration.addUrlPatterns("/*");
registration.setName("repeatableFilter");
registration.setOrder(FilterRegistrationBean.LOWEST_PRECEDENCE);
return registration;
}
}
檔案配置：
# 防止XSS攻擊
xss:
# 過濾開關
enabled: true
# 排除鏈接（多個用逗號分隔）
excludes: /system/notice
# 匹配鏈接
urlPatterns: /system/*,/monitor/*,/tool/*
這個時候就可以了，我們就可以進行測驗了
轉義和反轉義工具
/**
* 轉義和反轉義工具類
*
* @author lh
*/
public class EscapeUtil
{
public static final String RE_HTML_MARK = "(<[^<]*?>)|(<[\\s]*?/[^<]*?>)|(<[^<]*?/[\\s]*?>)";
private static final char[][] TEXT = new char[64][];
static
{
for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++)
{
TEXT[i] = new char[] { (char) i };
}
// special HTML characters
TEXT['\''] = "'".toCharArray(); // 單引號
TEXT['"'] = """.toCharArray(); // 雙引號
TEXT['&'] = "&".toCharArray(); // &符
TEXT['<'] = "<".toCharArray(); // 小于號
TEXT['>'] = ">".toCharArray(); // 大于號
}
/**
* 轉義文本中的HTML字符為安全的字符
*
* @param text 被轉義的文本
* @return 轉義后的文本
*/
public static String escape(String text)
{
return encode(text);
}
/**
* 還原被轉義的HTML特殊字符
*
* @param content 包含轉義符的HTML內容
* @return 轉換后的字串
*/
public static String unescape(String content)
{
return decode(content);
}
/**
* 清除所有HTML標簽，但是不洗掉標簽內的內容
*
* @param content 文本
* @return 清除標簽后的文本
*/
public static String clean(String content)
{
return new HTMLFilter().filter(content);
}
/**
* Escape編碼
*
* @param text 被編碼的文本
* @return 編碼后的字符
*/
private static String encode(String text)
{
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(text))
{
return StringUtils.EMPTY;
}
final StringBuilder tmp = new StringBuilder(text.length() * 6);
char c;
for (int i = 0; i < text.length(); i++)
{
c = text.charAt(i);
if (c < 256)
{
tmp.append("%");
if (c < 16)
{
tmp.append("0");
}
tmp.append(Integer.toString(c, 16));
}
else
{
tmp.append("%u");
if (c <= 0xfff)
{
// issue#I49JU8@Gitee
tmp.append("0");
}
tmp.append(Integer.toString(c, 16));
}
}
return tmp.toString();
}
/**
* Escape解碼
*
* @param content 被轉義的內容
* @return 解碼后的字串
*/
public static String decode(String content)
{
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(content))
{
return content;
}
StringBuilder tmp = new StringBuilder(content.length());
int lastPos = 0, pos = 0;
char ch;
while (lastPos < content.length())
{
pos = content.indexOf("%", lastPos);
if (pos == lastPos)
{
if (content.charAt(pos + 1) == 'u')
{
ch = (char) Integer.parseInt(content.substring(pos + 2, pos + 6), 16);
tmp.append(ch);
lastPos = pos + 6;
}
else
{
ch = (char) Integer.parseInt(content.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3), 16);
tmp.append(ch);
lastPos = pos + 3;
}
}
else
{
if (pos == -1)
{
tmp.append(content.substring(lastPos));
lastPos = content.length();
}
else
{
tmp.append(content.substring(lastPos, pos));
lastPos = pos;
}
}
}
return tmp.toString();
}
public static void main(String[] args)
{
String html = "<script>alert(1);</script>";
String escape = EscapeUtil.escape(html);
// String html = "<scr<script>ipt>alert(\"XSS\")</scr<script>ipt>";
// String html = "<123";
// String html = "123>";
System.out.println("clean: " + EscapeUtil.clean(html));
System.out.println("escape: " + escape);
System.out.println("unescape: " + EscapeUtil.unescape(escape));
}
測驗類
Controller 測驗類
@Slf4j
@RestController
public class XssController {
//鍵值對
@PostMapping("xssFilter")
public String xssFilter(String name, String info) {
log.error(name + "---" + info);
return name + "---" + info;
}
//物體
@PostMapping("modelXssFilter")
public People modelXssFilter(@RequestBody UserEntity user) {
log.error(user.getUserName() + "---" + user.getMobile());
return user;
}
//不轉義
@PostMapping("open/xssFilter")
public String openXssFilter(String name) {
return name;
}
//不轉義2
@PostMapping("open2/xssFilter")
public String open2XssFilter(String name) {
return name;
}
// 這里最好單獨建立物體，這里這里只是演示
@ApiModel(value = "https://www.cnblogs.com/blbl-blog/archive/2023/03/07/UserEntity", description = "用戶物體")
class UserEntity
{
@ApiModelProperty("用戶ID")
private Integer userId;
@ApiModelProperty("用戶名稱")
private String username;
@ApiModelProperty("用戶密碼")
private String password;
@ApiModelProperty("用戶手機")
private String mobile;
public UserEntity()
{
}
public UserEntity(Integer userId, String username, String password, String mobile)
{
this.userId = userId;
this.username = username;
this.password = password;
this.mobile = mobile;
}
public Integer getUserId()
{
return userId;
}
public void setUserId(Integer userId)
{
this.userId = userId;
}
public String getUsername()
{
return username;
}
public void setUsername(String username)
{
this.username = username;
}
public String getPassword()
{
return password;
}
public void setPassword(String password)
{
this.password = password;
}
public String getMobile()
{
return mobile;
}
public void setMobile(String mobile)
{
this.mobile = mobile;
}
}
}
總結
到這里spring boot 結合過濾器實作對Xss 攻擊的防范就實作了，Xss 攻擊總體來說危害還是挺大，對網站安全有較大風險，容易造成個人，公司等損失，
Xss 是較為平常的攻擊，我們對網站，資料安全始終在奮進和優化的路上，確保網路環境安全，干凈，
上面的攻擊手法大家可不要對其他網站進行嘗試哦！保護網路環境，平安你我他，
另外感謝大家的閱讀：有任何問題，錯誤，想法歡迎大家留言評論，
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標籤：其他